Abstract
INTRODUCTION
In 2002 Australians were scandalised by the accusations of alleged inaction by Archbishop George Pell and Dr Peter Hollingworth when sexual assault complaints were made to them as prominent clergy members. This led to observations such as those made by the Democrat Senator Andrew Murray:
There are two types of criminal and two types of crime: those who commit the crime of sexually assaulting children, and their fellow travellers, their accomplices, and those who criminally conspire and conceal those crimes to protect the perpetrators. Some church leaders are rightly accused -but far too few have been charged -with aiding 1 Lecturer in the Faculty of Law of the University of Technology, Sydney. isolation and as such has contributed to the 'culture of silence' around child sexual abuse by clergy members. This in turn has generated a culture where crimes are perpetuated, as the state is not prosecuting the crime of concealment by clergy members.
The paper will deconstruct the justifications and rationales for the privilege and exemption concepts by employing 'genealogy' as a tool for analysis. The purpose of using this framework is not to uncover the 'origin' of concepts, but to diversify the theme of continuity in a historical analysis, in order to understand how domains of knowledge have been formed. What is sought is how the privilege and exemption concepts were 'invented'. The knowledge associated with law and religion was made; it didn't just appear. 10 It is therefore necessary to identify the 'politics of truth'. That is, an analysis of the struggle for power and domination between 'unequals' through rituals and procedures that impose rights and obligations; to understand knowledge, its process of manufacture and the manipulation of traditional history. 11 The paper will analyse the discourse relating to the privilege and exemption concepts to 'disturb what was previously considered immobile', to 'fragment what was thought unified', and to show 'the heterogeneity of what was imagined consistent with itself.'
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Part One of the paper will discuss the legislative position, detailing the evidentiary privilege in relation to religious confessions; the offence of concealing a serious indictable offence and the exemption from prosecution for specified professions or callings; and as a point of comparison the professional communications privilege will be discussed to give an example of a privilege based in secular rationales. Part Two of the paper will deconstruct the historical justifications in relation to the privilege and exemption concepts, and demonstrate that this position is uninformed as it is based on assumptions about the existence and scope of the privilege as formulated by the common law. Part Three of the paper will deconstruct the freedom of religion 10 Foucault, Michel. "Truth and Judicial Forms" Excerpt in Power: Essential Works of Foucault, 1954 Foucault, -1984 , translated by Robert Hurley, The New Press 1974, 4. Foucault is discussing the invention of knowledge by examining Nietzsche's theory that a historical analysis of the formation of the subject and the birth of a certain type of knowledge is undertaken without ever granting the pre-existence of a subject of knowledge. 11 Foucault, Michel. "Nietzsche, Genealogy, and History", Bouchard DF (ed) Language, CounterMemory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews, Cornell University Press 1977, 150 . See also Foucault, above n 10, 7. 12 Foucault, above n 10, 147.
justification, and will argue that the doctrine of separation of church and state is undermined because the law is not founded on secular rationales. Part Four of the paper will explore the recurrent theme of spiritual considerations as a justification, and will argue that the primacy the law gives to the considerations of freedom of religion and spiritual considerations undermines the right of children to not be sexually abused.
PART ONE: THE LEGISLATIVE POSITION
Privilege
The general policy behind the privilege concept in the law of evidence means that a witness who is otherwise competent, and who can give evidence relevant to the proceedings, can refuse to disclose that information if it was given to the witness in confidence. 13 The consequence of a privilege validly invoked is that the witness is not compellable and this creates an impediment to the fact-finding task of the court.
Privileges are devised to protect the rights of a party to litigation or prosecution so as to ensure a fair trial, and in most circumstances it is their right to waive the privilege. As such, the government must ensure statutory privileges are in the public interest and in the interests of the administration of justice.
The law of evidence has traditionally recognised certain relationships, where essentially the preservation of trust between the confider and confidant, overrides the law's interest in full disclosure of facts. For example, to promote the stability of marriage the law recognises a privilege between husband and wife, and the law recognises a privilege between lawyer and client to promote candid exchange in preparation for litigation.
14 These privileges were formulated under the common law and, although their scope and applicability may have been altered, they have been preserved by statute. The religious confessions privilege has also been embodied in the legislation, but unlike the other privileges mentioned its rudiments are difficult to derive. The 'origin' of the religious confessions privilege is illusive; commentators, lawyers and politicians alike struggle to pinpoint its source. As will be demonstrated in Part Two, the common law position in relation to this privilege is uncertain. To overcome any uncertainty or inconsistency in the law, and the way in which it is applied, the legislature in NSW decided to embody the religious confessions privilege in legislation.
Religious Confessions Privilege
The Many people need to express themselves to a clergyman or other confidante; but unless that expression falls within the strict confines of the existing recognised privileges, it is not likely that the law ought to be extended to include them. However, the freedom of the ritual confession -which in our society is primarily practised by the Roman Catholic Church and some other orthodox churches -ought to be retained in order that people may protect their freedom of worship. Despite the indication that the privilege applies to any church or religious denomination, it is apparent that it will not encompass all religions because the definition of 'religious confession' is referrable to a 'ritual'. Not all churches engage in 'ritual confession' as acknowledged by the Attorney General. Further, there is no express provision for loss of this privilege and it applies to the fact that the confession was made, and to the content of the communication.
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The legislature identified three major justifications for embodying this privilege in legislation: history, freedom of religion, and spiritual considerations. The same justifications underpin the reforms to the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) in relation to the exemption from prosecution for concealing a serious indictable offence by clergy members. As such, the scope of the exemption should be limited to knowledge acquired in a ritual confession about a crime.
The justifications for the religious confessions privilege will be examined more fully in the following parts of the paper. It will be demonstrated that two of the justifications, freedom of religion and spiritual considerations, are primarily founded in non-secular rationales. This is logical, as the subject pertains to religious confessions. However, it is argued that the justifications are untenable in secular society and only assist in defining the scope of the privilege, and in turn, the scope of the exemption from prosecution.
Other forms of privilege are founded on secular rationales. The following discussion on the professional confidential relationship privilege is included to provide a point of comparison, to demonstrate how the scope of this privilege is referrable to the rationales that underpin it, and consequently, how those rationales define the scope of the exemption from prosecution. Sydney, 2002, 402 . The ALRC proposed a general exclusionary discretion applicable to all "confidential communications" (fn 466). 24 Ibid 402. The privilege also applies in circumstances where an Act provides that the rules of evidence don't apply, or that a person or body is not bound by the rules of evidence, or that a person is not excused from answering any question or producing any document or other thing on the ground of privilege or on any other ground. colleague (who was not a patient). Nor would it be within the scope of the religious communications privilege where a priest acquired information pertaining to a crime committed by another priest (who was not a penitent).
Professional Confidential Relationship

Concealing a Serious Indictable Offence
The general rationale for amendments to the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) at the time was to reform the law concerning offences involving interference with the course of justice.
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This was seen to be needed because:
At present there is no comprehensive statement of law relating to public justice offences. The law is fragmented and confusing, consisting of various common law and statutory provisions, with many gaps, anomalies and uncertainties. This issue was raised, by the author, in an interview with Justice Dowd, who as Attorney General initiated these amendments to the Crimes Act. In relation to the inclusion of medical practitioners in the regulation, Justice Dowd stated the rationale was that people had to disclose, for example, how they had received a wound in order to obtain proper medical treatment. 38 Pickering) . 40 Even if the court thinks it appropriate to refer to extrinsic material for guidance, for example the minister's second reading speech to interpret the meaning of those words; it would be of little or no assistance. It contains no reference to section 316 (4) or the inclusion of the professions or callings in the Regulation.
and rationales relating to the evidentiary privileges. This would result in the confinement of the exemption for the clergy, as it would be referrable to the scope of the evidentiary privilege for religious confessions. That is, the exemption only extends to knowledge of a crime obtained in a ritual confession.
Approval of the Attorney General
It must be noted that the section does not afford complete protection from prosecution 42 It is has been asserted that exercising the discretion is not driven by political motives in Australia. 43 The author does not wish to question the integrity of the Attorney General, or suggest intentional bias in exercising this discretion. However, the fact that a member of the executive branch of government holds the discretion is indicative of its political nature.
The author is unaware of any prosecutions of clerics under this section for concealing the crimes of other clerics in relation to child sexual abuse. freedom, because at the time of obtaining the information they are not 'practising or following a calling or vocation'. As one American commentator observes:
Religious liberty does not require the government to back off in the face of irrefutable, weighty, and sickening evidence of a concerted enterprise to further criminal activity… When the Constitution guaranteed religious freedom, no one believed it also provided a license to commit religiously-motivated crime. 44 The legislative reforms in respect to the Evidence Act and Crimes Act were enacted to ameliorate the law with respect to the requirements of disclosure regarding confessional communications made to a cleric. It is contended that the privilege and exemption provisions were limited deliberately by the legislature so that communications made outside a ritual confession are excluded.
Professional confidential relationship privilege is used as a point of comparison. This privilege balances the competing public interest in preserving the confidential nature of certain relationships against the public interest in having relevant evidence placed before a court to ensure a fair trial. This part of the paper has demonstrated how the scope of this privilege is referrable to the rationales that underpin it, and consequently how those rationales define the scope of the exemption from prosecution. This position is parallel to the privilege and exemption concepts.
The three major justifications that underpin the legislative reforms are history, freedom of religion and spiritual considerations. The paper will now consider the adequacy of justifications given to support the legislative reforms by deconstructing the discourse and ideology that has informed them.
PART TWO: HISTORICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
The legal arguments said to support the existence of the priest-penitent 45 privilege at common law are, that it must have existed at the time of Reformation, and had not been 44 45 In this part of the paper the privilege will be referred to as that of the priest-penitent, as it is derived from the common law. The religious confessions privilege is statutory language adopted when reforms to the Evidence Act were enacted.
displaced by any statute; and it was impliedly recognised in the case of R v Hay.
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However, it has been suggested that the privilege between priest and penitent did not exist at common law. 47 This view is based on the assertion that the modern law of evidence developed after the Reformation and as such, it was very unlikely that a privilege in favour of priests would have been created. 48 Further, there is a paucity of judicial support for the claim that no privilege arises out of the priest and penitent relationship. Both positions, as to existence or non-existence of the privilege, can be legitimised by the manipulation of traditional history. The effect of reliance on traditional history confirms the belief that the present 'rests upon profound intentions and immutable necessities' and it does so by 'dissolving the singular event into an ideal continuity -as a teleological movement or natural process.' 49 The analysis of this position will demonstrate that the historical justifications for the religious confessions privilege in the Evidence Act are based on assumptions and inconsistencies, and consequently, that this position is uninformed.
Existence of the Privilege at Common Law
R v Griffin 50 supports the proposition that the privilege existed at common law. 51 The court upheld that communications between a chaplain and the defendant charged with murder of her infant child were privileged. Reference to the death of the infant was made during the conversations, and the chaplain as her spiritual adviser had administered the consolations of religion. Alderson B. stated:
I think these conversations ought not to be given in evidence. 
Non-existence of Privilege at Common Law
Proponents of the view that the priest-penitent privilege does not exist at common law put the following cases forward. It should be noted that in terms of legal authority each case has little precedential value beyond persuasive authority. The cases that contain statements are either obiter dicta or could be differentiated on the facts. Again, this can only lead to the conclusion that justifications based on this position are uninformed in a legal sense. However, their historical value places them in a position that potentially undermines the arguments for the existence of the privilege at common law. It is unclear whether any 'confession' was made to the vicar and as other witnesses had testified to admissions made by the respondent it is doubtful whether the vicar's testimony was required at all. Further, the report does not disclose any reference by Jeune P to precedent or other legal analysis in support of this view. Given this, the principle expounded could only be considered as persuasive legal authority.
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Irrespective of its value as precedent, Jeune P made some pertinent observations.
Confidential communications are to be dealt with on their own merits and it is not to be assumed that there is a 'right' to withhold information from a court. This indicates that the privilege cannot be automatically invoked, so as to usurp the function of the court in determining whether the evidence is relevant and the witness is compellable. However, the denial that this right does not exist is not based on principle or reliable knowledge and is therefore an assumption. Equally, the proposition that a right does exist is an assumption. As was demonstrated earlier the legal arguments in favour of the existence of the privilege are not based on established principle or reliable knowledge.
Reference to legal discourse alone has not produced reliable knowledge in the sense that it does not contribute to comprehensive understanding of the subject. The development of knowledge requires something more. But this does not necessarily require the subject to be taken out of the historical context. The analysis here is not concerned with historical 'origins', but with 'unities' formed to establish understanding. These 'unities' are validated by syntheses in knowledge that are generally accepted from the outset.
Lawmakers often overlook the consequence of basing interpretation of a subject in a historical context and accepting the syntheses in knowledge. A context in which the dominant ideologies and religions of the majority have promulgated their tenets, customs and rituals, appropriated language and validated their history, may become the norm against which the new is to be judged. Reliance on traditional history is uninformed because it is based on unexamined assumptions. The irregularities in legal reasoning demonstrate that the 'origin' of the privilege is not immutable and recourse to a history that is also based on assumptions results in an uninformed position. The conflicting views as to whether the privilege arose pre-Reformation or post-Reformation demonstrate the kinds of assumptions the common law is based on.
The development of knowledge requires something more than recourse to origins.
Unquestioned syntheses in knowledge form unities; their purpose is to establish further understanding of the subject. However, the traditional history of the religious confessions privilege, and the unities within that history, do not contribute to 
PART THREE: FREEDOM OF RELIGION
The doctrine of separation of church and state is devised by two principles: nonestablishment of any religion through law (non-establishment principle), and the principle of free exercise of any religion (freedom of religion). 70 The doctrine can be understood as addressed to all governmental institutions, in relation to religious institutions, to imply that the state should not interfere with the church and the church should not interfere with the state.
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This is viewed as essential for free and democratic society and as such has been included in the Australian Constitution. 72 It is suggested that the inclusion of freedom of religion in the Constitution was owed more to political expediency than to principled reflection by the founding fathers. 73 Religious groups were successful in campaigning to have reference made to 'Almighty God' in the preamble. As a way of reassuring nonreligious voters and voters from minority religions s116 was inserted to assure them that the government could not impose or interfere with religion. 
Non-Establishment Principle
With regard to the non-establishment principle the High Court of Australia has interpreted the prohibition against a 'law for establishing any religion' as aimed at laws that make a particular religion the national religion, or establish a state church, or 70 80 This highlights a fundamental tension between laws that give more weight to spiritual liberty than the protection of children. This issue will be explored further in Part Four of the paper.
Freedom of Religion
It is suggested that the doctrine effects not only institutions within a democracy, but is also applicable to individual conduct. legitimises certain types of religion and hence the operation of the exemption and privilege in certain situations. Additionally, the rituals and procedures embodied in the law, imposing rights and obligations, have not created further understanding of the subject. What it does demonstrate in this situation is how the law is being utilised as a tool for domination.
It has been observed that the principle of free exercise of religion:
… has an expanding dynamic built into it (calling for a positive and active legal attitude towards claims to have one's religious requirements respected through legal accommodation, exemptions and privileges), and this very dynamic threatens to undermine the disengagement of the State from religious matters demanded by the nonestablishment principle.
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The non-establishment principle would not be eroded by the principle of religious freedom if policies and laws had sufficient grounding in secular considerations. This, to some extent, would also ameliorate this issue of discrimination against minority religions and the non-religious as:
Adherence to the principle of secular rationale helps to ensure that, in determining the scope of freedom in a society, the decisive principles and considerations can be shared by people of differing religious views, or even no religious conviction at all.
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Additional arguments that support the free exercise of religion rationale are ingrained in non-secular considerations, which in reality allow the jurisdiction of the church to override the jurisdiction of the state -'asserting the spiritual over the temporal '. 90 Examples include the rationale that ministers will always abide by the ethical duty of confidence, and that breach of this confidentiality can result in excommunication from the church. The church promotes the confidentiality of the confessional as sacrosanct and ministers have a duty not to violate the sacramental confessional seal. question in this way reverts to a simple dichotomy, which in itself does not provide a satisfactory answer. The answer will never be satisfactory because of the complexities of sustaining religious freedom within a secular society. The approach becomes one of attempting to strike a balance between competing interests. This of course requires a shift in power relations. In the past and in the present, primacy has been given to spiritual considerations over temporal considerations in relation to the relevant religious privilege and exemption from prosecution. This shows partiality towards the rights of the clergy, undermines the rights of children not to be abused and exposes a lack of mercy from both the State and the Church towards them. The primacy given to these considerations and the consequence of this position by lawmakers will be discussed further in Part Four of the paper.
PART FOUR: SPIRITUAL CONSIDERATIONS
The purpose of this part of the paper is to explore the recurrent theme of spiritual considerations as a justification pertaining to the laws in question. The common law analysis in Part Two of the paper was limited to gaining an understanding of its applicability as a historical justification. In this section the common law analysis will be elaborated on to extract the extents to which spiritual considerations have been relevant in formulating the law. This approach also applies to spiritual considerations regarding the freedom of religion justification. In doing so, the paper will discuss the consequences of allowing the jurisdiction of the church to override the jurisdiction of the state. The primacy given to spiritual considerations 92 over temporal considerations 93 by the clergy, and the allowances made by the state to accommodate this, is ultimately impinging on the right of children to not be sexually abused. There are limits to the allowances the state will make and this is evidenced by confining the scope of religious confessions privilege in the NSW legislation to 'ritual confessions'.
Spiritual vs. Temporal
92 Spiritual is used to denote matters that relate to the spirit or soul, especially as acted on or proceeding from God, holy, divine, inspired; or concerns with sacred or religious things. 93 Temporal is used to denote things of this life and secular justifications or rationales.
The anomalies that arose in the common law do not only relate to whether the priestpenitent privilege existed or not, but also as to the scope and applicability of the privilege. Further, the following cases emphasise the tension in balancing spiritual and temporal considerations.
In Broad v Pitt 94 Best CJ points to anomalies in the law regarding privileges:
I think this confidence in the case of attorneys is a great anomaly in the law. The privilege does not apply to clergymen, since the decision the other day, in the case of
Gilham. I, for one, will never compel a clergyman to disclose communications, made to him by a prisoner; but if he chooses to disclose them, I shall receive them in evidence. The same applies to a person deprived of whose advice the prisoner would not have sustained proper spiritual assistance. I do not lay this down as an absolute rule, but I think such evidence ought not to be given. At common law I have no doubt it was confined to a ritual confession made according to the discipline of the particular faith in so far as a privilege existed at all. I do not wish to be taken as deciding that nothing other than a ritual confession is covered by that section. It may be that in our statute we have gone further. It may be that it extends to confessions for spiritual ends which do not conform with the requirements of liturgy.
But here the confession was not made for any spiritual purpose. I am satisfied that it was not here made to a priest in the character of a priest… I hold the evidence to be admissible. In the latter half of the twentieth century, in some jurisdictions at least, there is an attempt to accommodate the various religious groups in society. Although the definition has been expanded so as not to require a formal confession in both of these cases, it does not mean that the privilege will attach to all confidential communications. The communications are relevantly confined to those that are a 'request for spiritual help' or made for a 'spiritual purpose'. In doing so the law is seeking to address any imbalance that would occur if all communications made to a cleric fell within the scope of the privilege.
(Emphasis added)
The next case demonstrates the privilege in a predominantly Catholic country, Ireland, and as such can be considered a non-secular society. There the privilege is recognised by common law but not the common law of England. In Cook v Carroll 104 a priest was held in contempt of Court for refusing to testify as to the matters during a conference at his house, in the presence of the defendant and the plaintiff's daughter. 105 On appeal to the High Court the priest again refused to testify and the court had to determine whether the priest was guilty of contempt.
In Cook, Duffy J distinguished and refused to apply the common law of England. 105 The daughter alleged that the defendant had seduced her and her mother brought an action for the seduction. The daughter attributed paternity of her unborn child to the defendant, who on learning this went to the parish priest. In the report it is said that the priest "intervened in the hope of averting a public scandal in the interest of his flock, by either inducing the girl to withdraw a false charge, or persuading the man to make amends for the wrong done to her. The approach of Duffy J is impeccably legalistic and using this legalism to wipe the slate clean, provides the basis on which an alternate form of legalism can be established.
This 'surreptitious appropriation of a system of rules' is used not only to verify the existence of the priest-penitent privilege but also to expand its scope to include communications outside of the confessional. As Foucault observes:
The successes of history belong to those who are capable of seizing these rules, to
replace those who had used them, to disguise themselves so as to pervert them, invert their meaning, and direct them against those who had initially imposed them;
controlling this complex mechanism, they will make it function so as to overcome the rulers through their own rules.
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At this point in history Duffy J has been successful in seizing the rules of legal reasoning so as to direct those rules against and replace the principles contained in English common law. This process enabled Duffy J to manufacture the discourse of the common law of Ireland by manipulating the traditional history of the law.
Reformulating the law in this way is legitimised by acknowledging the non-secular nature of the society in which the law is applicable.
As was mentioned in Part Three of the paper, there is a fundamental tension between laws that give more weight to spiritual liberties than temporal liberties, such as the protection of children. The issue of child sexual abuse by the clergy is public and there is increasing demand for more accountability by church leaders. In the United States the issue of sexual abuse and the denial of the issue by the church reached a crisis point. 114 Similarly, in Australia, the issue was been highlighted by the accusations of inaction against Archbishop George Pell, and the accusations of inaction against Dr Peter Hollingworth, when sexual assault complaints were made to him as Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane. 115 And more recently the issue has arisen with the prosecutions of Gerald
Francis Risdale and Raymond Frederick Ayels for sexual offences.
The Catholic Church in Australia produced a protocol to address the procedural and pastoral procedures for sexual abuse. However, the increasing number of allegations of sex abuse and sexual misconduct by the clergy led to a review of this protocol and, as a result, it may offer less transparency and public accountability -'ostensibly in the interests of protecting clergy rights.' 116 The Vatican went further, vetoing a plan by Catholic Bishops in the United States to adopt a policy of 'zero tolerance' towards clergy found guilty of child sex abuse. 117 It appears that the Catholic Church, at least in some respects, is continuing to be isolationist by maintaining a level of self-regulation with low-level accountability, and maintaining an unmerciful attitude towards the victims of abuse.
There are examples of churches taking a more proactive stance. An Anglican priest was defrocked on the grounds of sexual misconduct for an indecent assault involving a 14-year-old girl more than twenty years ago. 118 This measure was made possible by an amendment to the church's sex abuse procedures. The church took action despite the DPP dropping criminal charges due to a conviction being unlikely. Given the controversy surrounding the perceived inadequacy of response by the former Archbishop of Brisbane on these issues, the church and the broader public is clearly sending a message of intolerance towards sexual abuse by the clergy.
Many professions in NSW have a duty to report suspected cases of child sexual abuse. 119 The The only conclusion observers can draw is that until Catholic Bishops and Protestant equivalents are prosecuted and put behind bars for failure to report, or for collusion or accessory to a crime, the cover-ups and inaction will continue.
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There are some jurisdictions, mainly in the United States, making laws to hold the church more accountable in cases of child sexual abuse. 122 This position is said to make measure of deference and confidentiality, they are now to be treated more like secular institutions.
(Emphasis added)
In those jurisdictions proposed changes to the law are largely based on mandatory notification of child (sexual) abuse, and to punish supervisors who knowingly expose children to child abusers. 124 This has possible consequences for the preservation of the religious confessions privilege. In Connecticut, a Bill was debated that would have required priests to report abuse if a child was in imminent danger, even if they learned about it during confession. The Bill was amended to keep confessions private because there were protests from Catholics. 125 In Illinois, a Bill was introduced to add the clergy to the list of mandatory reporters but it was criticised because the Bill would not require the clergy to report information learnt while acting as a spiritual advisor. 126 Although mandatory reporting is an option, where a balance could be struck between spiritual and temporal considerations, by adding the clergy to the list of mandatory notifiers excluding information obtained by confession, this is not necessarily needed in NSW if section 316 of the Crimes Act is utilised.
Several criticisms have been levelled at the inclusion and operation of section 316, including a recommendation that it should be repealed. 127 Some of the criticisms pertain to the potentially inappropriate use of the section by law enforcement agencies and the philosophical objection that although there may be a moral duty to assist police, there
should not be a legal duty. 128 Despite these criticisms the section has been retained, and confining its scope to the rationales that underpin the privileges in the Evidence Act provides an opportunity to use section 316 appropriately as it applies to the enumerated professions, particularly the clergy. Without this clarity we would have the ironic situation where lay people not only have a higher legal duty to assist in the administration of justice, but also a higher moral duty than the clergy. The state should be compelled to reconsider the untenable justifications for viewing the church in
